In view of the levels of public debt reached, growth must necessarily be combined with budgetary rigour, let us stop opposing what can and must be virtuous. It is not the "efforts" of the French that must be bent to reforms or austerity, it is the reforms and austerity that must serve growth, and therefore the French. Let's talk about profits! Who sells a product by praising its defects?

We learn every day that everyone, the government, politicians, trade unions, entrepreneurs ... is for growth, no kidding, but so what? Everyone is in favour of good weather and growth, even the most rigorous supporters of budgetary orthodoxy, which is precisely what they consider to be a sine qua non for recovery, or at least for reducing the risk of a lasting recession, or lasting sluggish growth.

Today, what seems to be sustainable is not development, but sluggish growth.

So growth, yes of course, but how and what?

The search for growth has become a quest for the Grail, a presidential incantation, a secular and republican prayer. It is called for growth as others urged the Ds best efforts to help them.  

For the past 50 years, we have been experiencing a downward trend in our growth rate: on average per decade :

• 5.9% in the 1960s (ah the sixties!)
• 4.1% in the 1970s
• 2.3% in the 1980s
• 1.9% in the 1990s
• 1.4% for the 2000s
• between 0.5 and 1% for the years 2010

The last years in which France experienced growth that we can consider significant and structurally impactful, i.e. above 3%, were 98, 99 and 2000 (respectively 3.4%, 3.3% and 3.7%, which is what we dream of today). And in the last 30 years, only two years have exceeded 4% of growth: 1988 (4.7%) and 1989 (4.2%).

Today, it seems very difficult to go beyond a range situated at best between 1.5% and 2%, and in reality, we do not succeed in removing the 1%, a performance that is very insufficient to influence the major social and macroeconomic indicators (unemployment, purchasing power, competitiveness, exports, innovation, etc.).

Growth is therefore declining, but in the face of a public debt that is growing, and even in great shape. Above all, beyond its evolution (+50% between 2007 and 2011), and its absolute value (2,000 billion of public debt), it has exceeded the alert threshold. A threshold that leads to a spiral of public debt because from now on each year France will have to repay between 200 and 250 billion euros, which is almost the annual budget of the State (290 billion). France must not only repay but also borrow again and again, becoming the leading issuer of debt in euros (overtaking Germany).

This rate of almost 100% of debt is important beyond dogmas and theories: two American researchers (Reinhart and Rogoff in the book "This Time Is Different") have shown empirically and historically that such a level is systematically harmful to growth, causing a loss of earnings of 0.5 to one point of growth.

The relationship between debt and growth is therefore neither linear (it depends on the debt ratio) nor symmetrical: debt seems to benefit more from growth, with a reduction in % of the GDP (not in absolute value) in years of sustained growth (1999, 2000, 2001 then 2006, 2007 for example), than growth seems to benefit from debt. Moreover, the French are not mistaken in this cause and effect relationship, often considering when questioned on the subject that government spending must be reduced to promote growth.

And beyond the economic approaches, public opinion is anxious about the dramatic European cases that have been exposed in recent years, and has schizophrenic dreams of a welfare state that it knows is no longer there (neither in ideas nor in means).

We are also collectively perfectly aware of the economic constraints, and in particular the budgetary constraints, considering that the State, caught up in these constraints, is no longer really able to act on things. A State that is neither innovative, nor a leader, nor a force for proposals (or more exactly for solutions), as shown by a 2012 presidential campaign that was more about rejection than about projects.

Like a doctor in default of treatment, the politician minimises the ills that he can no longer and no longer knows how to heal. The denial of reality is more exactly a psychological denial.

The essence of political action now consists of oscillating like a crazy pinball between 3 old demons: the Coué method (the recovery is here, the unemployment curve is reversing, ...), scapegoating (global finance, previous governments, Europe, social dumping, bosses...) and the ostrich policy (what crisis?, we are less affected than others...).

For the first time, the all-powerful political leader (since he was elected by the gods or the votes) is powerless to act on things, feels it, and struggles to adapt (pre-formatting of political thought). As for the people, administered by, or rather vassals of, the Republic, supposedly powerless and destined to submit to the enlightenment of their leaders, they feel this new political incapacity, perceive their new "powers" (consumers, media, citizens, etc.) and dream of themselves as the Welfare-Me, which explains the emergence of all the individual and citizen initiatives.    

The French are now chronically disappointed in politics, as in everything else. We are said to be world champions in pessimism, but we are also champions in disbelief (we do not believe in the end of the world). This is good, even if it would be more exciting to believe in the new world than to challenge the apocalypse.